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How did Xunzi explain the conflict between “the good is evil” and the reality of morality – is Xunzi’s moral theory a theory of morality construct or morality actually?
Author: Liu Binglu (Teacher of the Department of Philosophy, Fuleton, California State University)
Source: Author Authorized Confucian Network Published
� G.Hagen introduced Xunzi’s structural theory and explored the relationship between moral structure and moral reality in discussion, and then proved that Xunzi’s moral thinking could not be used to analyze it with structural theory. The basis of the construction theory is an anti-realistic theory, while the most basic development of Confucianism is the actual theory of morality. Although Xunzi proposed the argument of nature and seemed to be in harmony with Confucianism’s orthodox thinking, his basic concepts actually maintained the Confucian tradition, the transformation of the channels was constant, the sage king had unique moral cognition and ability, and the value norms had independent objectivity. Xunzi’s “sadness” can be regarded as a structure, but the structure he emphasized is an actual state of tribute, not the connotation of value standards. The conclusion of this article is that Xunzi proposed that the Holy King’s construction of the law on the tribute system does not mean that he accepted the construction. The types of construction as post-design ethics are metaphysical that Xunzi would not accept.
Keywords
Xunzi, moral construction, morality is in theory, and anti-quality is in theory, Kurtis G.Hagen
The directing discussion
Xunzi has always been questioned in the regular position of Confucianism. This is not only because the Song and Ming wise scholars widely accepted Mencius’ nature goodness, but also because Xunzi’s metaphysics had many initiatives that were incompatible with the morality of traditional Confucianism. The morality described by Yishen and the Doctrine of the Mean, the natural and harmonious nature of the Taiyang, the unity of the human nature, and the human nature of the human nature, have become the cooperation topics of the Song and Ming dynasties. The “humanity is evil, and the good is evil” proposed by Xunzi is almost completely ignored under such morality. In the past ten years, it has been proposed that Xunzi’s philosophy is a connotation of Confucianism’s “moral construction” from a series of essays by Kurtis G. Hagen. Some scholars have also begun to analyze Xunzi’s philosophy of morality from this perspective. Literally speaking, what Xunzi called “sadness” and “construction (construction)”The structure)” seems to be very different. In Xunzi’s view, the moral order of human society is the result of human efforts. It is the sage’s founding of the moral principles, regulating the French style, fostering people’s emotions, and guiding people’s desires. The order of morality does not develop naturally from humanity. Xunzi also advocated the natural discussion of the way of heaven. “There is a constant movement in heaven, and it is not for existence, nor for the destruction of Jie” (Section 17 of the Heavenly Book). The order of human ethics does not exist in the natural world. But can Xunzi really believe that virtue is pure and pure as the result of human construction, and that the way of heaven is only the heavenly movement of the natural world, not valuable, and goodness is only a human being who does not have objection for evaluation? If his moral theory is a moral construct, can it be integrated with the morality of Confucian tradition? This article develops from Hagen’s moral construction theory, explores the relationship between moral construction theory and moral reality, and uses Xunzi’s literary introduction to develop Xunzi’s unique moral reality theory.
The comparison between moral construction and moral reality
The moral construction begins with the proposal of John Rawls (Rawls 1980[2]) as a new commentary on Kant’s philosophy. Rawls believes that real political moral problems should not be based on a virtual object, because political moral problems are closely related to human value. Independent on human value, there is no absolute mutuality between value truth and morality. He emphasized that the objectivity of value must be developed from actual considerations, and differences in the times, differences in social situations, historical conditions, all will form differences in value and moral integrity. He described Kant’s moral sensibility theory as a sensual moral structure: Sensual morals have sufficient sensual principles, and under fair and fair sensory thinking, they can achieve moral judgments and value selections that are sufficient to establish objectivity. The purpose of this moral construction theory is: “The principled truth cannot be independent of the common sense that perceptual thinkers will generally criticize in their specific situations.” Rawls further proposed his normative conception, including his idealized process of the rationale, original position, veil of ignorance, and common sense achieved by the sensualist cooperation in cooperation [3]. This moral normative structure can be a kind of rejection of the actual nature of independent object morality, but at the same time, it also bases objectivity on the basis of human sensory common sense. Therefore, it is divided among other forms of anti-moral realism: moral doubts, moral opinions, moral opinions, moral expressions, moral expressions, moral arguments (Error Theory), moral anti-cognitivism, etc.
Sharon Street pointed out in an article published by Philosophy (Street 2010)[4]Even though Rawls has many advocates for the normative structure advocated by political philosophy, his theory has received a lot of doubt and criticism in the field of metaethics discussing moral nature. The basis of post-ethics exploration of the standardized and proposition truth: Is moral value completely based on our judgments and evaluations, or does our judgments and evaluations have to precede the independent value world that exists in humans? This problem can actually be traced back to the Euthyphro Dilemma in Plata: Is good good things good because God determines that they are good, or does God judge them as good based on the good things themselves? When used in terms of value, the question is: Is things have good value because someone likes this, or do we have to judge their good value from the actual basis based on the inherent value of things? In other words, can value and valuing depend on each other? Nathaniel Jezzi’s argument about whether this question can be independent of human response-independent: is it the widespread evaluation tree of human beings that human beings can widely recognize these values (Street 2006,156)[5]? Sharon Street believes that value is entirely derived from evaluation, so we cannot find the value of interest at the level of value. “The evaluation exists before the value, so the anti-value is actually the correct theory” [6]. She explained the basic subject of moral construction theory to say that “value is constructed on a variety of evaluation conditions.” In other words, the so-called value must be derived from the perspective of “a biological perspective that has evaluation ability and has a value judgment” (Street 2010,367).
But this dichotomy of swaying is too brief. The objectivity of value does not represent the super-experimentality of value, and the relationship between value and rated creatures is not necessarily the same as described on Street, and it must be valued only if the existing rating is established. We can borrow Peter Railton to value and fact Fact) analysis: “A value concept like good (or bad) only exists as long as there is a value judgment relative to the subject that cares about. A subject that has value choices and cares about certainly has its own specific perspective and its subjectivity. In a universe without subjectivity In the world, there will be no value. But all actual subjects are also objective. Their real attributes are not based on their self-thinking, but these real attributes also determine what they care about and determine” (Railton) 1986,19)[7]. He divided this passage from its perspectiveMake self-affirm value judgments and review conditions that are beneficial to it from a personal perspective. The former is subjective, while the latter is objective. In this concept, the author proposes that value can be value for agents for the reality of the individual, but this does not show that the value is based on the evaluation of the individual (value resulting from the agent’s value). For example, life is valued to organic creatures and has no value to organic life, but this does not mean that all creatures will give positive reviews to life. Respect is valued only for creatures with subjective consciousness and without emotions, but the value of respect is not the determination of the tree standing on the subject. Basically, all things have the best conditions for their existence, and the things that are beneficial to this best condition have positive value. Such value exists objectively, is determined by the nature of the existence of things, not based on existing ratings from humans. Therefore, we can also recognize i
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